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ABSTRACT
Stem cell basic science has sparked a lot of attention because
of its use of cells coming from ‘destroyed’ embryos. An
ethnographic study conducted in two developmental
biology laboratories located in India and France
demonstrates that lab professionals do not see the use of
these cells as controversial. What appears to be a major
topic of reflection is the killing of mice. A hierarchy of
deaths is delineated when biologists evoke the kind of lives
at play in their science. A comparison between narrations of
cell experimentations and mice sacrifices enriches a
biological approach to the living through genetics, which is
nonetheless performed in daily scientific practices.
Laboratory workers enact other perceptions that point at
being alive or having a life. They acknowledge, with
personal convictions or expressions of intense affects, lives
that are said to be embodied and experienced, while being
hierarchised for the sake of science and dying patients.
Laboratory workers’ narratives of a hierarchy of deaths
provide them with arguments to engage with discussions
happening outside of their workplace about the handling of
living materials in experimental settings.
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Introduction
Basic research in developmental biology using human embryonic stem cells
(huES) has sparked a lot of attention since the 2000s because these cells can
come from human embryos once conceived in reproductive medicine units.
Developmental biology studies the growth of tissues after fertilisation and has
benefited from the invention of in vitro fertilisation, a technique used successfully
since 1978 to conceive embryos in laboratories. One outcome of such technique is
the production of supernumerary embryos that can be frozen and are sometimes
given to basic research. A topic of discussion stemming from such donations is the
‘destruction’ of embryos in the process of making cell lines out of them. Such
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research also accompany narratives of hopes for new cures through the invention
of a new medicine, the regenerative one. Incurable and lethal diseases could be
treated if new cell therapies were to be invented. More generally, the use of
animals in basic research is also source of intense controversial discussions
within and outside of scientific communities. In developmental biology, animals
are commonly used to conceive embryos, and gestating mice, for example, are
‘sacrificed’ to study the molecular mechanisms implied in the growth of embryo-
nic and foetal cells, or to study mutations that are implied in various pathologies.
These three examples (destruction of embryos, lethal diseases and animal
sacrifices) point at the presence of death in the making of the science of life.
How do developmental biologists talk about death in their activities? What
does death reveal about the ways biologists understand the lives of the materials
they work (cells and mice)?
In this article, I draw upon narratives about the therapeutic horizon of research
and the different cells, embryos and mice eleven laboratory practitioners exper-
iment on. Located in France and in India, these biologists express similar narratives
based on shared practices, while they acknowledge local variations of societal
debates. I share their meanings and emotions associated with the deaths of stem
cells, mice and patients. In these narratives, deaths are expressed through various
understandings of life. Biology – their science of life – is one major aspect of
these understandings but it is not the only one. Biologists intertwine their science
with personal convictions or religious beliefs that differentiate being alive and
living a life, being an animal and belonging to ‘humanity’. These convictions are
strongly connected to the meanings associated with dying and killing.
Building on feminist writings about death in the life sciences, with a focus on
animal sacrifices and the care for cells, in this article I also discuss topics such as
the molecularisation of the living and the embodiment of the lived. I argue that
laboratory workers delineate a hierarchy of deaths that is dependent on how they
understand what kinds of lives are handled in the context of basic science in
developmental biology.
Death and the Science of Life
‘Life becomes imaginable as always pregnant with death’ (Bharadwaj and
Inhorn, 2016, p. 67). Writing on reproductive medicine and stem cell research,
Aditya Bharadwaj and Marcia Inhorn underline various deaths accompanying
biotechnologies such as embryo loss in in vitro fertilization, embryo donation
to basic research or foetal reduction following multiple pregnancies. They
draw on a body of literature that has extensively shown how death is central
to an anthropology of the biosciences, reproduction and health (Cecil, 1996;
Layne, 2002; Lock, 2002; Franklin and Lock, 2003).
In biology laboratories, death is also part of making the knowledge of life. The
most studied aspect of death in basic science is animal sacrifices. The study of
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animal sacrifices reveals ways of understanding animal lives and how they are
cared for. The literature on cell culture shows common traits with the ways
cells are also used and cared for. Finally, death also appears under the trait of
genetic mutation and human lethal diseases.
Animal Sacrifices
Animal sacrifices are one major expression of death in the lab and has been
studied from different perspectives. The literature on animal research has
characterised sacrifices as the transformations of animals into generalisable
knowledge for science, understood as the common and valuable goal of exper-
imentations (Arluke, 1988; Lynch, 1988; Haraway, 1997; Rémy, 2009; Thomp-
son, 2013). Relating to classical studies, these events enact situations in which
a life considered to be of lesser worth is taken to obtain a greater good
(Hubert and Mauss, 1899; Durkheim, 2008). In the case of animal research,
an animal’s life is taken instead of a human one, as a substitutive subject
sharing a common biological corporeality, in the pursuit of new cures for
patients (Rémy, 2009; Thompson, 2013, chapter 6). The literature on animal
sacrifices shows an ambiguous back and forth logic that identifies and differen-
tiates lab animals and human beings.
Writing on scientific experiments, Birke et al. (2007) underline numerous ways
of defining animals. Amongst the various significances at play, a dialectic of simi-
larities and differences between animals and humans is stressed as both belong to
the ‘animal kingdom’ from a biological perspective but are also different ‘kinds’
(Birke et al., 2007, p. 19). The ways humans relate to different animal kinds
vary in time and space, through diverse cultures and various forms of encounters.
The ‘lab animal’ (Birke et al., 2007, p. 21) is one form of the animal kind (with
variations depending on the species). ‘A lab animal, after all, is one whose life is
determined by the requirements of science’ (Birke et al., 2007, p. 25).
Donna Haraway (2008) explored what relating to a lab animal means when
she wrote about the ‘politeness’ implied in the ‘instrumental relations’ embedded
in care and shared suffering. Finding similarities between lab animals being
sacrificed and scapegoats, she writes:
The substitute, the scapegoat, is not Man but Animal. Sacrifice works; there is a whole
world of those who can be killed, because finally they are only something, not some-
body, close enough to “being” in order to be a model, substitute, sufficiently self-similar
and so nourishing food, but not close enough to compel response. (Haraway, 2008,
p. 79)
This back and forth logic of closeness and distance has also been analysed by
Tora Holmberg through an emphasis on the emotions associated with killing as
a form of ‘mortal love’. Mortal love encompasses dilemmas engrafted in the ‘dialec-
tics of care and exploitation’ and the importance of ‘killing well’ (Holmberg, 2011,
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p. 148 and 154). This ambiguous relationship is also highlighted by Svendsen
and Koch (2013) who write about the sacrifices of piglets in experimental neo-
natal research. They stress that ‘a calculative exchange that defines an absolute
moral difference between humanity and animality and constitutes the piglet as
a raw material of science, and a corporeal exchange by which the piglet
appears as a sentient substitute belonging to the same collective as the research-
ers’ (Svendsen and Koch, 2013, p. S119). Lesley Sharp (2017) has also written
about the links between morality and identification, when describing the ‘huma-
nization’ of monkeys as they are given access to television in order to entertain
themselves in their scientific homes.
If sacrifices imply that animals are treated as instruments for the sake of
science, requirements of science entail ‘humane’ practices of care that are not
only expressed by subjective and affective accounts of biologists but are also his-
torically situated. In the UK, for example, the notion of ‘animal welfare’ has been
central to the regulation of animal experimental use (Kirk, 2010, 2014, 2018),
and interdisciplinary collaboration explicitly addresses how the science of life
is not to be radically differentiated from the humanities in that respect
(Davies et al., 2016).
Caring for the Cells
Focusing on the daily activities of stem cell culture, similarities with animal
experimentation and their dialectic of care and instrumentation can also be
found. In the USA, following a model of organ donation, biologists have tried
to develop a framework to assess the ‘death’ of embryos as a moral marker of
their donation to basic science and their transformation into stem cell lines
(Testa, 2008). Strong emotions and feelings of attachments can also be associ-
ated with the daily scientific cultures of stem cells (Suzuki, 2015; Merleau-
Ponty, 2018a).
Writing on the ways biologists connect with cells while they culture them in
experimental protocols, Mianna Meskus (2018, chapter 5) refers to a ‘continuum
of instrumentality and care’ in the ‘crafting’ of a new stem cell biotechnology
(induced pluripotent stem cells). Looking at the practical and embodied
routine of handling cells in the laboratory she finds that ‘all forms of instrumen-
talisation are not destructive, and all forms of care are not without the intention
of benefit’ (Meskus, 2018, p. 150). One benefit implied in the care for animals
and cells is the making of science and its applicative potentials, often referred
as ‘translation’ (Friese, 2013).
Projecting Biomedical Applications
Similarly to animal experimentation, the life and death of cells are related to the
life and death of patients who suffer from lethal diseases. Rayna Rapp showed
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how cells cultured in laboratories and patients waiting for cures are connected
through genetic mutations (Rapp, 2003, p. 135). Death, in such cases, is associ-
ated with the study of genetic mutations that can be lethal for human patients.
Death intertwines basic science and its applicative therapeutic horizons. It is
linked to an interpretation of life as being ‘itself’. Writing from her reading of
Canguilhem and Foucault, Franklin (2000) analyses that ‘life itself’ is a genetic
code, a molecular approach to life, a process of signification inscribed in
matter. ‘Nature becomes biology becomes genetics, through which life itself
becomes reprogrammable information’ (Franklin, 2000, p. 190). This biological
approach to life and medicine relates cells, animals, patients and biologist united
in a common goal: increasing scientific knowledge in pursuit of therapeutic
applications. This said, when looking at how the death of cells, animals and
humans are expressed, this common goal entails a strong hierarchy stemming
from different ways of valuing lives.
A Hierarchy of Deaths for Different Kinds of Lives
As the empirical findings in this article show, whilst producing a knowledge of
‘life itself’, laboratory workers link together patients’ deaths, animal deaths and
cell death by pointing at embodied, experienced understandings of life.
Responding to a molecular based interpretation of life, Didier Fassin (2009)
suggested focusing on lived experiences of being alive. ‘Life which is lived
through a body (not only through cells) and as a society (not only as species).
I propose to name it “life as such”. Obviously it is related through many ramifi-
cations to “life itself” if we use this expression to designate the biological exist-
ence of the living and its political extension as populations’ (Fassin, 2009, p. 48).
I am not investigating populations here, but nonetheless find common features
with my ethnography.
Technobiological understandings of life as being itself are to be found along
understandings of life as being embodied in existences that are hierarchised
depending on their shifting belonging to categories (i.e. ‘model’, ‘animal’,
‘humanity’) that organise ways of relating. It is particularly salient when biol-
ogists evoke the meaning of death in their activities. The hierarchy of deaths
that biologists express is very often grounded in different ways of understanding
life, as biology, as well as various embodied processes of being alive. Like there
are different kinds of animals (Birke et al., 2007), there are different kinds of
lives, which are expressed through the hierarchy of their deaths.
Methods
I did a comparative ethnography in two developmental biology laboratories
located in France, in the suburb of Paris and in Bangalore in the South of
India. Between 2011 and 2014, I recorded interviews, and participated in the
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daily life of laboratories (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). I was invited to
observe in cell culture facilities, at molecular benches and during lab meet-
ings. During these occasions, I took notes of the conversations between the
lab workers and discussed what they were doing with them. I also was given
access to the written protocols in their laboratory notebooks. I also attended
lunches and after work activities. In the following ethnography, four people
were part of the laboratory located in France, and seven people were from a
laboratory located in India. The quotations I reference in this article are
from the two heads of laboratory, three Ph.D. candidates, one postdoc,
one engineer, one student in internship, and two laboratory assistants.
The French laboratory had a smaller team and no animal sacrifices were
performed during my fieldwork. The biologists working in France referred
to past experiences, before they entered their current laboratory where cell
culture is the technique used to produce the molecular data of ‘life itself’
(Franklin, 2000).
I chose to do a comparative ethnography between a European based labora-
tory and an Asian based laboratory to study the reasons why human embryonic
stem cells do not spark the same debates in those locations (Bharadwaj, 2012)
and how scientific activities are performed by laboratory workers in the
different contexts. This comparison shows that, despite these different contexts,
common traits are to be found in such different locations. Biologists acknowl-
edge local variations of debates about the manipulation of human embryonic
stem cells, but they also express shared views. These shared views sustain the
idea that scientific culture displays ‘global’ understandings of life (Franklin
et al., 2000). This global culture of science refers to geographical, linguistic
and ontological elements.
Similar scientific technologies can be found in both countries as well as
similar languages (biological meanings expressed in English), either through
the reading and writings of scientific articles, or through verbal communications.
In France, I mainly communicated in French with biologists, though their meet-
ings were conducted in English, as requested by the head of the laboratory, who
wishes to train his team to the international language of their science (Houdart,
2008). In India, I mainly communicated in English with biologists, who com-
monly speak two to three languages (English and Hindi, the two national
languages and very often several regional languages).
Basic Science of Life Itself for Human Health
Basic Science and Translational Outcomes
Death is an important topic when biologists from both laboratories talk about
the translational (applicative) value of their basic science (Rapp, 2003; Friese,
2013). Even if the immediate outcomes of the research and articles published
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by the laboratories are not therapeutic, basic and translational research are
linked together and united in a common goal.
Patrick, the head of the laboratory located in the suburb of Paris, has weekly
‘data sessions’ with his team to discuss the results of their experimental proto-
cols. Even though his team is in France and they all speak French, Patrick
requests that these sessions be done in English so that the researchers practice
the shared language of the global scientific community. On one occasion, a biol-
ogist presented dissatisfying data. Patrick commented, in English: ‘We need
something robust, we need to be sure of what we do. The patient is waiting
for that.’ Indeed, the value and justification of basic research is to run exper-
imentations on cells and animals allowing failures, toxicity and repetition of
the same experimentation (Rémy, 2009; Thompson, 2013, chapter 6). Using
cells makes sure of the safety of the future human patients who could be involved
in clinical trials.1 In the same vein, Tamal, who works in the laboratory located in
Bangalore as a Ph.D. candidate says:
There are two aspects again, one thing is the basic biology and the other one is the
applicative biology, translational research. What I feel is that it needs to go hand in
hand, because one cannot do without the other. Translational research is important,
because it is ultimately going to lead to something, going to materialise into something,
say a drug, or a vaccine, or a cure for a disease. That is definitely important. But to
understand that, basic biology is again very important, so, without that you cannot
understand the other.
If translational science cannot go without robust basic science, the latter is
nonetheless strongly linked to applicative outcomes. Talking about the justifica-
tion of their basic experiments, biologists in France and India refer to general
categories such as ‘human’, ‘humanity’ and ‘society’ or ‘the public’ related to
hope for new cures to be invented (McKay, 2000). These scientific projects are
justified because patients belonging to the human kind (Birke et al., 2007)
suffer and die from diseases.
For Padmini, the head of the laboratory in Bangalore, the value of huES is
strongly connected to their translational potential: ‘What is valuable is what
can be useful for the community, for curing’, she told me about cell lines. In
basic research laboratories, the scope of knowledge is connected to ideas of
being ‘useful to the general society’ so says Pratosh, a young intern student in
India, as well as Sandeep, who is about to finish his Ph.D in the same institution.
In terms of institution, these goals are also strongly underlined by the law or by
the fund providers. In France, research using human embryonic stem cells must
have a ‘therapeutic goal’ to be authorised.2 In India, this is not the case, but the
medical horizon is nonetheless expressed as quite normative, especially if one
wishes to get funding. Padmini, shared that: ‘When you open a lab, it is
because you have a question to ask for the scientific community and for human-
ity, this is why you get funds.’
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Translational Outcomes through Life Itself
Basic science studies build on molecular understandings of life as being itself
on global grounds (Franklin, 2000), as diseases are studied through their
biology and associated to very general categories such as ‘humanity’. During
an interview, Tamal talks about the purpose of doing research on the
genetic mechanisms of cell development. He links the study of ‘life itself’ to
its applicative potentials for ‘people’ who suffer from diseases associated
with ‘genes’.
So eventually all the researches, according to me, should be directed in that how this is
helpful to the human, mankind, genes, how it is helpful, how if you just knock down
that gene, in case of cancer if you just obliterate the function of a gene, how the cancer
is spread? How the cancer has progressed? Whether you can control the cancer… at
least, if it cannot be controlled, whether you can understand the mechanisms of… so,
then later on, people can get… take it off…
Ouarda, a postdoctoral researcher in Patrick’s laboratory, had studied the
genetics of a cardiovascular disease by comparing samplings of healthy and
affected persons, when she was doing her PhD. In her interview she said: ‘I
started by understanding why there is a cardiovascular disease, why you are
affected by these diseases, and all, from the genetics’, and ‘for the postdoc, I
have reached another level, which is to try to find solutions.’ Ouarda seemed
to like her work a lot and was always very lively. When I asked her why her
research is of so much interest to her, she answered: ‘I feel that I really do
stuff for humanity’. ‘Can you tell me more?’ I added.
Because, she said, I try to participate, even if it is a small participation, it is really not
that big compared to…when you find solutions and all. It is only a tiny step. But I
know it is a key step to be able to do stuff for…
Saying that, she vividly claps her hands, then apologised for that intense
expression of her enthusiasm. ‘Sorry, to get to… for humanity, that’s it!’.
Sandeep also evoked the therapeutic goal of research, circulated in one of the
most renowned scientific journal that has an international reach, and narrates
the happy end of a cure:
Yeah, I remember an article which is published in Nature. It was on the hematopoietic
differentiation of stem cells and how these cells were transplanted into a bone marrow
patient and the patient got recovered. Yes. It was a complete process and it had an
ending. That was like a story for me, and it got me interested into it.
Biologists study basic biology of stem cells on a day-to-day basis and they
continuously project a translational future, in which human patients are in
need of treatments. In these projects, cells are materials for research. Biologists
are aware that human embryonic stem cells can be associated with the destruc-
tion of human embryos (Testa, 2008). But, for the laboratory practitioners
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I talked to, the use of cells, and their destruction, are not associated with a form
of death that needs particular recognition. When they discuss the destruction of
embryos and the handling of human embryonic stem cells, death is not associ-
ated with genetics or biology more broadly, but with reflections on the differ-
ences of different kinds of lives, some deserving to have their deaths
recognised and some not.
HuES: Immortal Without a Body and a Soul
HuES: Immortal or Dead, But Not Killed
Human embryonic stem cells are not considered to be particularly controversial
for the heads of the laboratories I have been working with. Of course, they are
nonetheless aware of the controversies and acknowledge them from the point
of view of the location of their laboratories, while implying their personal and
scientific views as well as the existence of a global scientific community who
do not necessarily share the same views than other social groups on the status
of the huES.
Padmini runs her laboratory in a country where huES research and human
embryos in vitromanipulation do not spark debates about their status as poten-
tial individual human lives (Kumar, 2001; Bharadwaj and Glasner, 2009). It is
easier for her to differentiate herself quite clearly from the western debates,
associated with the USA, a country she considers ‘hypocritical’. In the
process of distancing herself from American debates, she refers again to the
death of ‘people’, whose lives are considered as more precious than the ones
of the cells.
It is by discovering western opposition that I came to think about it. These stem cells
… Prolife… For Indians, it seems really weird. Especially coming from a country a lot
more violent and oppressive. The USA are bombing people. And then they have issues
for these cells. It is hypocritical.
In comparison, Patrick runs his laboratory in a context where huES research
is very controversial and has sparked a lot of public debates, like in the USA or
many other countries in Europe. In France, huES research was banned until
2005 and banned with exceptional authorisations until it was authorised
under exceptional circumstances in 2013. One of the reason is that human
embryos are considered as ‘potential human persons’ by French bioethics, a
status that define them as entities in between ‘bunches of cells’ and ‘persons’
(Merleau-Ponty, 2018b). Patrick explained why the term ‘line’ was so important
to spread at the beginning of huES research – in the early 2000s. This term
helped clarify the biologists’ views on these cells that are not understood as
potential individuals who are destroyed but as a set of immortalised cells. In
the following piece of interview ‘we’ refers to the community of researchers
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on a global scale, working within a western context in which it was important, in
the 2000s, to differentiate embryos from cell lines in order to ease the controver-
sies by stating a clear difference between the two. Patrick explained:
So this term of « line », was, indeed, [used] so that people understand well that, once we
derived, once we isolated these human embryonic stem cells, these cells became
immortal, because we had [cell] culture conditions allowing them to become immortal.
This is what we call a line. And so, as soon as we had a line, we obviously did not need
another embryo to obtain the same cells. And so, it seemed important because, very
often, at least in the years 2000, people thought that, every day, when we wanted
embryonic stem cells, we had, in quotation marks, “to kill” an embryo to obtain cells.
Using quotations marks is significant because it acknowledges ‘people’s views on
embryos as potential individual lives while suggesting the idea that Patrick does
not see the act of cell line derivation as a deadly one. In contrast, it is an act of
immortalisation (which implications are not simple, see Lock, 2001 and Glasner,
2005). The idea that huES are not derived from an act of killing was also
expressed when comparing the death of cells and the death of animals.
One day, Ouarda lent me her laboratory notebook from 2007. At that time she
was a young unexperienced student doing an internship. In the notebook, I
found a section dedicated to ‘the sacrifice of embryonic stem cells’, in which
she describes diverse molecular protocols. I had never read or heard anybody
refer to molecular protocols on cells as ‘sacrifices’, even if I understood what
she was referring to. In order to study molecules implied in cell differentiation
or pathological mutation, cells are cultured in petri dishes with diverse media
containing molecules that interact with them while they develop over days or
weeks in incubators with the right temperature and air composition (Landecker,
2007). Once the cell culture protocols are completed, the human and mouse cells
are brought to the molecular benches where biologists mix the cells with diverse
chemicals to extract DNA, RNA and proteins3 and study them. This interven-
tion accompanies the disappearance of the cells. Once at the molecular bench,
‘it is dead’, comments Patrick.
Even if cells are dead at the molecular bench, writing that they are subjected to
‘sacrifices’ is not common at all. As I was quite surprised by this formulation, I
asked Ouarda to explain it to me. She smiled and replied: ‘At this time, I thought
like with animals, under the chemical hood, we kill them, we sacrifice them. I
didn’t know.’ ‘And now, what do you say?’ I add. ‘Now’, she answers with a
laugh, ‘I say that I do a cross-link!’. A crosslink is the process of chemically
bounding two molecules present in the cells. In molecular biology, this technique
is used to study structures and interactions of proteins.
Unlike ‘with animals’, lab animals, cells are not said to be killed, even if they
can be ‘dead’ (Birke et al., 2007). Cells are processed by techniques. Indeed, when
they are not used in molecular biology, biologists ‘throw’ the cells in a yellow bio-
hazard bin dedicated to biomaterial waste. When cells are used for a molecular
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protocol, the name of the protocol is put forward. The act of transforming living
cells in molecules is not associated with the idea of death, even if the cells are
destroyed in the process. Of course, I am not referring to the biological knowl-
edge of cell death here, also known as apoptosis, a mechanism understood as
being co-constitutive to the life of cells (Landecker, 2003). I am pointing to
the symbolical recognition accompanying the act of transforming living
materials into data, a recognition that is associated with the use of terms like
killing or sacrifices (Arluke, 1988; Lynch, 1988; Haraway, 1997; Rémy, 2009;
Thompson, 2013).
Nonetheless, the absence of recognition to the fact that cells die when they are
brought to the molecular bench does not mean that biologists do not care for
their cells. Care and affect practices around cell cultures (Suzuki, 2015;
Merleau-Ponty, 2018b) are not contradictory with their use as tools (Franklin,
2013; Meskus, 2018). And biologists can be devastated when their cells are con-
taminated, though, a hierarchy of deaths ease the tensions produced by the loss
of cells. Blanche, a PhD student in Patrick’s lab mentioned a conversation she
had with a friend of hers, a nurse working in a hospital who had put the life
of a patient in danger because of a wrong dosage. Blanche explained: ‘I recall,
I had called her because my cells were contaminated. She calmed me. She told
me ‘No one died’ (Il n’y a pas mort d’Homme). It’s true.’
HuES: A Kind of Life with No Soul
The acceptability to work on huES, and destroy them in the process, is some-
times related to the idea that they have no soul. Biologists who are believers
can refer to non-secular (Roberts, 2016) understandings of life that they inter-
twine with biological approaches. Ouarda, does not feel that there is an issue
with working with huES as she considers them as a ‘body without soul’, in
accordance with her religion, Islam. Indeed, suras XXII, 5 et XXIII, 14–15 of
the Qu’ran indicate how the embryogenesis unfolds in this context. The angel
fixates the destiny of the child to be born after forty days of development. The
individual soul is said to be present 120 days after conception (Walentowitz,
2003, p. 108). The fate of human embryos given to research is legitimate and
Ouarda valorises their cells as materials for a therapeutic goal: ‘To me, a body
without soul is nothing…well, nothing, these are cells we can use to cure
other souls.’
Padmini, Patrick and Ouarda are not the only ones to dissociate individual
lives and human embryonic stem cells. Blanche reaffirms the distinction
between being alive and living a life, when she compares huES and induced plur-
ipotent stem cells. Induced pluripotent stem cells are adult skin cells that are
reprogrammed to resemble embryonic stem cells. They lose their skin identity
and gain the capacity to differentiate into any body cell type. Blanche recalled
the start of her research, when she thought about the status of her cells:
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Clearly, it [the embryo] was such a premature stage that to me, the embryo, it was a
bunch of cells and… careful, of course, things should not be out of control, I comple-
tely agree and all. But it was not an issue at all for me. (…) And to reprogram cells of
someone who has lived… I am not a believer actually. There is something. Something
happened. These cells, they lived. It was a living being. It was someone who thought,
laughed, did a lot of things in their life. (…) I mean, there are populations who cry
more for the death of elders that the death of newborns for example, because they
lived, because they did a lot, even if it is the natural order of things…Well I would
be a little… not like that, but I just say that from a biological perspective, if I want
to draw a parallel, for me, the embryonic stem cell, the huES does not have a “soul”
in quotation mark, when the iPS, it has a print somewhere.
This interview extract highlights a difference between living materials that are
considered to have had a life because they belonged to actual persons, and
ones that are not. This biological ‘print’ encapsulates an existence of thinking,
laughing, and acting in a lifetime. This biological version of a ‘soul’, for this
scientist who is not a believer, points at the lived life of someone who was
alive and embodied. And this lived life gives more value to cell death than the
one of cells that are alive, without having lived, like embryonic cells.
The emphasis on lived lives to make sense of death in the laboratories
appears particularly salient when biologists talk about killing mice. Sacrifices,
which entail the symbolical recognition of transforming a body into scientific
data, appear to be connected to the recognition of living a life. This recog-
nition differentiates mice’s lives from living cells. As mice are said to have a
life of their own, their death is acknowledged and killing them is sometimes
considered to be very difficult. The emotional hurdles that can arise during
sacrifices are nonetheless eased through the overarching scientific and thera-
peutic goal, which make of mice lives living tools at the service of science
and humanity and their biology.
Reflections on Killing Mice
Certain Ways to Take Lived Lives
Differentiating ‘cell culture’ from lab animals (Birke et al., 2007), Manon, a
researcher in the French laboratory, stresses this shift from being alive (like
cells) to having a life of one’s own, a life that is lived and experienced with
other mice. Doing so, she used the term ‘killing’, by distinguishing it from
being ‘contaminated’ and ‘thrown’ away, and she stressed the emotions that
come with this important shift.
Manon: I have sacrificed, maybe, 350 mice, in three years of Ph.D., so after some time
… I did it because I needed it for my studies, but it is not something I did with joy… I
consider that I have worked enough on the animal for… I know that, I mean, I like
other stuff, cellular culture for example. (…)
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Noémie: Why do you prefer cell culture then?
Manon: Precisely because, for me, you have less life in your hands, so… .your cells are
contaminated…well, you throw them away, but it is not a life [my emphasis]. But
when you go get your cage… your mice, they are all well, rolled into a ball next to
each other, sleeping. It is always a little annoying to kill them, so, euh…
Noémie: It is more difficult.
Manon: Yes, it is. And me, what I liked too… at the beginning of my Ph.D., the first
mouse I killed, really, it was a traumatism. I told myself that I could never do it… the
problem is that, as we go along, you kill so many of them that, after some time, it is also
mechanical, I mean that you do not realize… it is not that you do not realise, because
me, I…when I knew I had a day of sacrifices, I went reluctantly. But you are less
careful for the mouse you are killing than for the first one. It was more like an assembly
line, and that, that bothered me after some time.
The emotional difficulty expressed is twofold. Firstly, the emotional difficulty
relates to the idea that mice, on the contrary to cells, have their own life, shared
with other mice. Secondly, sacrifices are difficult not only because of how mice’s
lives are viewed, but also because their amount produces a situation in which the
care implied in killing lessens with time, making them similar to products in an
industrial setting. The association with the assembly line contradicts ideas of
‘killing well’ that are so important in ‘mortal love’ (Holmberg, 2011, p. 148).
If killing well and avoiding objectification of these lives are important, mechan-
isms are nonetheless in place to restrain attachment (Daston, 1995). Karen is a
research assistant in the Indian laboratory. The following quotation highlights
Karen’s views on killing mice, and how different contexts of encounters are
very important in how killings are experienced.
I cannot stand sacrificing a mouse, so I, most of the time, don’t do it myself. I ask for
assistance. Especially the females, because I am of the same gender! (She smiles) I feel a
little awkward to kill a female mouse but hey, I mean, in India, we have a lot of mice
going here and there. (laughs) We… if I find a mouse in my home, I would definitely
go with a broom to kill it. But these, because they are bred, and we get to them every
day, they are more like our pets. So, but we haven’t… I haven’t named them, just num-
bered them (laugh).
Laboratory mice are closer to Karen than wild mice because she takes care of
them, and, in the process, finds analogies between them and her. This caring
relationship is similar to a domestic one, except that naming is not part of the
picture – this is preventative measure taken to avoid becoming too attached
to the animals. In other settings, analogies between humans and animals can
be used to introduce moral sentiments in care practices. Lesley Sharp has
written about biologists who work with primates. She argues that television is
a means of humanising monkeys and a way to take care of them in a moral
way. ‘If the use of macaques in science is to be a moral project, it requires the
humanization of the monkey’ (Sharp, 2017, p.239). In Karen’s case, mechanisms
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are in place to avoid acknowledging similarities between herself and female mice.
The absence of personification is a mechanism that allows for a certain
emotional distance, but this distance is not complete and gender similarities
produce an identification that makes it difficult to kill, and requires Karen to
ask a colleague to do it for her.
The contexts through which animals are encountered are very important to
navigate feelings and representations towards giving death and taking lives. The
interpretation of laboratory contexts can be an occasion for societal debates.
When I asked Manon if she had conversations outside of her laboratory about
the daily handling of living entities in her activities, and especially human embryo-
nic stem cells, she answered by pointing at anti animal experimentation activists
that she had met in Nantes, a city of the West of France. She narrated how she
could not agree with their depiction of death giving. She considers this approach
to be hypocritical because it displays a slaughtering relationship between scientists
and lab animals when, she argued, this type of killing is not the bloody type.
Manon: I remember an argument I had with… it was in Nantes, on the big square
of Nantes. (…) There was an association campaigning against animal experimen-
tation with things that really shocked me. An activist was seated, tied up to a
chair with red all over the place to signify blood, with images… They showed atro-
cious images of animals’ mutilation and all. And me, I was in Ph.D., practicing on
mice, so I had killed a lot in my activity and I found it, I mean, very hypocritical and
really scandalous to show this when they do not know anything about it. So I went
and told them… but, anyway, one cannot discuss with these persons. But this, I
found it shocking (…) especially because, well, you show a mouse to the public, a
rat being slaughtered, of course nobody likes to see that, so afterwards everybody
is against animal experimentation. Yet, we could not have had some drugs
without animal experimentation, so that’s it. As for stem cells, I had less discussions,
I mean, questions about stem cells.
This extract summarises very well the hierarchy of deaths at play for some
biologists, killing mice is not easy but is justified to develop new therapies, and
the use of stem cells is not so much of a debate. Furthermore, animal death
and death giving are indeed subjected to debates, fluidities, normativity and
constructions that animal activists, ecofeminism or speciesism engage with
by putting them on big squares. Manon criticises two things in anti-exper-
imentation activism here, the wrong analogy and the wrong context. She cri-
ticises the instrumentation of other kinds of animals to consider the scientific
sacrifices she thinks are legitimate, as hard as they are to perform, in the name
of medicine and cure for a dying humanity.4
‘This Mouse is a Disease Model’
To ease the affective tensions implied in killing mice seen as lived lives, scientific
training invites laboratory practitioners to see them as biological models, as tools
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used mechanically (Haraway, 2008). ‘We could not have had some drugs
without animal experimentation’, finishes Manon to criticise anti-experimen-
tation activism, even if sacrifices are not easy to perform. This dilemma at the
heart of the ‘instrumentality-care continuum’ (Meskus, 2018) is also expressed
by a laboratory assistant in the laboratory located in the suburb of Bangalore.
Sadar referred to this dilemma by pointing at the recognition of death in the
case of mice, because he thinks they have individual lives, endowed with a
soul. But, a translational horizon for which they are disease models participates
to the expression of a hierarchy of deaths.
No. Initially, when I had to sacrifice a mouse it was like… I was like ‘no I can’t kill it’.
Like, adult mice, I can’t kill it. I can’t take anyone’s life, because I don’t like it, and also,
I have no right to take anyone’s life. But like Doctor [Padmini, the head of the lab] said
to me: […] “we are doing it for science. We are here to discuss something, something
which will cure a disease, so for this, we need a disease model and this mouse is a
disease model [my emphasis…] so you have to learn this.” So, initially, I didn’t like
that much, like sacrificing a mouse because then you kill it, it will move for some
time and then it will die. But slowly, slowly I got used to it.
Noémie: And now, it’s okay?
S.: Now, it’s okay.
N.: You don’t have any…
S.: I’ll feel bad. Obviously, I’ll feel bad, but I’ll pray once for that mouse after killing it,
but I have to kill.
N.: You’ll pray for the mouse?
S.: After killing, I will feel bad, I will say something, like… .
N.: Okay, okay. What will you say?
S.: I’ll just say that (he smiles)… Let its soul rest in peace. […] But I support this using
mice as a model system, because you need something to study the diseases. And then, if
you don’t study the disease, then obviously it will affect many people and many people
will die.
To be a lab animal, in this case, is not only to be made a disease model that is
cared for, for the making of proper science, but also to be recognised as having a
life of one’s own that is to be respected and the capacity to be given a death,
which affectively costs the one who kills. This emotional price will be less and
less with time, as the animal is seen less as an embodied individual with a
soul and is more directly considered as a disease model used to help human lives.
I also met several biologists who do not pay the same emotional price. The
interview from which the following moment is extracted was done after several
interviews during which I heard about the emotional difficulties to sacrifice
mice. I was very cautious then, implying that it was difficult for my interlocutor
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too. I was wrong. Indeed, Balaji, also a PhD student in Padmini’s lab, did not
initially understand my question because his focus was on the material he
studies, not its source. In his case, the scientific training is dominant in his under-
standing of life valuation. In his research, Balaji uses embryos dissected from
gestating mice at different stages of development. In order to access the
embryos, he sacrifices the animals by rupturing their neck before they are dis-
sected to extract the gestational sacs in which the materials of study are located.
Noémie: Let’s go back to the mice, is this something, euhhhh, that you…How can I
say that? Euh, what is it for you to have to sacrifice mice for your research?
Balaji: Embryos…
N: And mice, because you have to kill the mice for…
B: For getting embryos…
N: Is this something that never gave you any problem, or you had to think about it or
… ? You know. You did this for the first time for your Ph.D or before?
B: Yes for the first time for my Ph.D but… truly speaking it didn’t give me much…
much pain that we are killing a mouse.
N: Do you have any idea why?
B: If we kill a mouse and we don’t get the embryos then we think ‘oh…we… useless
… sacrificed this mouse’. But, in general, if we get embryos out of it and we are able to
do… and if we get something new, then it is for better… […] It is for more
knowledge.
Even when killing does not bear an emotional price, this act is still called a
deadly one, a sacrifice of an animal, and not ‘doing a cross link’, like with
human embryonic stem cells brought at the molecular bench. The recognition
of the lived lives is associated with the idea that sacrifices should be useful.
The overarching rationale is that science and knowledge assist the pursuit of
making potential cures.
Conclusion
How do developmental biologists talk about death in their activities? What does
death reveal about the ways biologists understand the lives of the materials they
work with (cells and mice)? Different expressions of deaths are to be found relat-
ing mice, cells and patients in a hierarchy that points at different kinds of lives.
The sacrifice in experimental settings has been extensively studied, pointing
at one expression of death implying the process through which lab animals are
transformed into proper data for the sake of science and medical translation
(Arluke, 1988; Lynch, 1988, Haraway, 1997; Birke et al., 2007; Rémy, 2009;
Thompson, 2013). In both laboratories, professionals express how the
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suffering and death of human patients is an overarching compass, through
biological traits of ‘life itself’ (Franklin, 2000, p. 190). The notion of ‘life as
such’ has been created to discuss the biologisation of life and to point at
lives that are lived and embodied, in the context of migration (Fassin, 2009,
p.48). The ethnography of this text invites the suggestions offered by the
notion of life as such into biology laboratories where life itself is studied
and made (on IVF see also, Merleau-Ponty, forthcoming and Bärnreuther,
2018). It is through the acknowledgments of different forms of death that
we have shown this, highlighting a hierarchy justified by various ways biol-
ogists understand what ‘life’ means.
Birke et al. (2007, p. 19) have shown how animals belong to different ‘kinds’
when relating to humans. ‘Sacrifices’ of ‘lab animals’ are transformative pro-
cesses that entail the identification and differentiation of the animals from
their human counterparts, both biologically and morally (Haraway, 2008,
p. 79). The study of cells’ use show common traits, such as ‘the continuum of
instrumentality and care’, the expression of ‘mortal love’ in handling these
materials, or their transformation into molecular data (Holmberg, 2011,
p. 148 and 154; Meskus, 2018, chapter 5). But, the ethnography presented
here shows that these similarities between animals and cells’ uses do not lead
to calling cell death an act of ‘killing’ or ‘sacrifice’.
Even if laboratory practitioners are well aware of the controversies associated
with ‘destroying’ human embryos to experiment on their stem cells, whether
they work in France or India, they are not personally attached to such charac-
terisation. Cells are not said to be ‘sacrificed’, even if they are cared for and
they lose life when their molecules are analysed after cell cultures, when molecu-
lar data are extracted from them. The death of cells is not recognised beyond its
technical and biological definition. This absence of recognition points to the idea
that these cells do not have a life that is lived, on the contrary to mice. Compar-
ing cell death and mice death give another perspective on sacrifices, that are not
only about transforming animals into data through a continuum of instrumen-
tality and care, identification and differentiation, but also about acknowledging
lives that are lived, even if they are taken for science, humanity and hopefully,
human patients.
Compared to the absence of symbolical recognition of cell death, the death of
mice is strongly acknowledged through expressions of death giving like ‘killing’
or ‘sacrifices’, more or less intense emotions, reluctance and actions that under-
line the importance to respect those lives through care in giving death, and
sometimes, even prayers for their souls. Nonetheless, mice are lab animals,
and scientific culture has ways of building the acceptance of their deaths, by
associating them with tools, disease models, and, doing so, by reaffirming the
overarching death of all, the ones of human patients. Mice, like humans, have
a life of their own, but they are lab animals, which put their death at the
service of translational outcomes.
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Life as a set of molecules and their various interactions in the early days of
embryonic development is what the two laboratories I have investigated study.
The daily practice of science narrated by the laboratory workers in my ethnogra-
phical study enact other perceptions that point at being alive or having a life, at
lives that are said to be embodied and experienced, while being hierarchised and
made unequal in their treatments, for the sake of science and humanity. Inspired
by the idea of ‘kinds of animals’, (Birke et al., 2007), I suggest that a hierarchy of
deaths between cells, mice and patients is a fine expression of different kinds of
lives in two laboratories of developmental biology.
Notes
1. The use of animals in basic research is connected to the rise of bioethics after the
Second World War and the Nuremberg trials. (Löwy and Gaudillière, 1998; Gaudil-
lière, 2001).
2. (article L2151-5 of the public health code).
3. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid): a biological macromolecule with a double helix shape. It
is present in all cells and inside some viruses. It is the material support of genetic infor-
mation, or genome, from which proteins necessary for cell functions are synthetised.
To do so a piece of the DNA is translated into RNA.
RNA (ribonucleic acid): Biological molecule, a copy of a piece of DNA (a gene). It
helps connect together, following a specific order, some molecules that are present in
the cell thanks to protein degradation or alimentation. It helps the synthesis of pro-
teins.
Protein: Biological macromolecule having a particular function in a cell.
Molecule: Basic structure of matter that is constituted of the chemical assemblages
of atoms.
4. Indeed, the work implied in slaughtering animals, in the case of food production is yet
another type of killing animals (Vialles, 1994).
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